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An Examination of Factors that Account for Differences in the Degree of IPO 
Underpricing between China and South Korea: 
A Case for High Technology Sector 
 
By Xiao Zhang 
September 15, 2014 
   
This paper examines the factors for IPO underpricing phenomenon in China and South Korea  
over the period 2010 to 2014. This paper uses the IPO samples extracted from the technology  
sector and the sample consists of 164 IPO issues covering the period 2010 and 2014 in these two  
countries. Besides, the paper examines the relationship between these factors and the degree of  
IPO underpricing for Chinese and South Korea technology companies.  
 
The paper finds that offer price, D/E ratio and pre-tax income per share play an important role in  
explaining IPO underpricing for technology sector in China and South Korea. The results  














Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgement                                                                                                         i 
Abstract                                                                                                                         ii 
Table of Contents                                                                                                         iii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  1 
                 1.1 Background and Overview                                                                      1 
                 1.2 Method of pricing                                                                                    2 
                 1.3 Purpose of study                                                                                      3 
                 1.4 Structure of research proposal                                                                 4 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review                                                                                     4 
              2.1 Explanations of Underpricing of IPOs                                                       4 
                    2.1.1 Monopoly power enjoyed by investment bankers                             4 
                    2.1.2 Winners curse phenomenon                                                               5 
                    2.1.3 Legal issues related to the shares                                                       6 
                    2.1.4 Dynamic strategy                                                                               7 
              2.2 Other empirical evidence from South Korea and China                             8 
 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology                                                                             10 
              3.1 Source of data                                                                                             10 
              3.2 Methodology                                                                                               12 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis and Comparison of Results                                                      15 
              4.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables                  15 
              4.2 Comparison of different independent variables                                         16 
              4.3 The result of regression model                                                                   17 
v 
 
                    4.3.1 Offer price                                                                                           19 
                  4.3.2 Log of offer size                                                                                    19 
                  4.3.3 Log of offer timing                                                                                19 
                  4.3.4 DE ratio                                                                                                 20 
                  4.3.5 Pre-tax income per share                                                                       20 
                     
Chapter 5: Conclusion, Limitation and Recommendation                                         22 
             5.1 Conclusion of the study                                                                                 22 
             5.2 Limitation of this research                                                                             23 
             5.3 Recommendation                                                                                           23 




















Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and overview 
Securities market in China has contributed to the economy since 1990s’ when Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange were established. This created an avenue for many 
rapidly growing firms with good investment opportunities to go public since the traditional 
sources of financing, banks and retained earnings, could not be sufficient enough to undertake 
new projects. 
 
In the year 2011, more than 2000 listed companies went public in China. Compared to other 
developed markets, China is less exposed to the uncertainty of the stock market and is not 
heavily affected by global financial crisis because of the open door policy. The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (SCRC) was established in1992 and is charged with the responsibility 
of monitoring the whole financial market. 
 
China has a relatively short history of securities market, while South Korea established its first 
security market (the Market Organization) in 1987. In May 1996, the KOSDAQ Securities 
Exchange was established to offer services to small and intermediate businesses. 
 
Unlike many emerging countries where large number of businesses does not get listed, the South 
Korea primary market has witnessed a large number of listings in the mid-1990s. From 1990 to 
2012 alone, more than 1,796 listed companies went public in South Korea and market 




Previous researchers have presented quite convincing empirical evidence to support the fact that 
initial public offerings (IPOs) are, on average, underpriced. This is also confirmed for initial 
public offerings (IPOs) that went public in China in recent years and traded on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. As for Korean securities market, just like their 
Chinese counterparts, IPOs are generally underpriced. 
 
Underpricing is related to abnormal return between offer price and the first trading period market 
price for initial public offering (IPO). This phenomenon of IPOs is like a puzzle in finance 
studies (Grinblatt and Hwang 1989). Researchers have confirmed that the extent of underpricing 
of IPOs varies from country to country. 
 
 As shown in Table 1 in Appendix, the weighted average initial return is 137.4% for China while 
the South Korea weighted average initial return is 61.6%. This implies that in emerging markets 
the degree of underpricing of IPOs might be significantly higher than the degree of underpricing 
of IPOs in developed markets. In United States average initial return is 16.8% and in Germany, it 
is 24.2%. 
 
1.2 Method of pricing 
Two methods of pricing shares in an IPO market exist. The first one is to sell the shares at a 
fixed price. This is the approach used by some countries, including companies in Dubai Financial 
Market (DIFX). The second is the book building method, popular and used widely and also the 




When companies receive the clearance, their prospectus must indicate the price of IPO, issue 
date and so on. Securities market is being closely monitored by Chinese government and leaders 
of economic department would focus on execution of duty on occasion to conduct the 
standardization of market.  
 
At present securities markets gradually become more market-oriented. That is, the issuer and 
underwriter could negotiate with each other on the price rather than allowing the Chinese 
government to set up the preliminary offering price. 
 
1.3 Purpose of study 
As a matter of fact, what motivates me to research into this area is that the results would provide 
useful empirical evidence to investors. I would establish a regression model to test the 
relationship between underpricing of IPOs, and the issue size, offer price, offer timing, D/E ratio 
and pretax income per share. 
 
1.4 Structure of research proposal 
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is focus on review of literature, and the various 
“school of thoughts” that are identified and inferences that are drawn from IPO underpricing. 
Chapter 3 contains the regression model, data sources, and analysis of the results obtained for 
“school of thoughts”. Chapter 4 is on the analysis of the results obtained from the regression. 





Chapter 2: Review of literature 
2.1 Explanations of Underpricing of IPOs 
Mispricing of IPOs is calculated as the difference between the offer price and real market price at 
the end of the first day of trades. Especially, underpricing of IPOs is like the pricing of an initial 
public offering (IPO) below its market value.  
 
Ritter (1984) noted that between 1960 and 1982 in the United States, the average initial return 
public offerings was trading a price 18.8% higher than its offering price shortly after public 
trading started for the around 5000 firms that chose to go public during that period. Some 
evidence indicates that underpricing can be explained by some hypotheses, such as monopoly 
power enjoyed by investment bankers, winners curse phenomenon, legal issues involving 
institutional investors and the underwriter or issuing firm. It can also be used as a dynamic 
strategy to evaluate the market price. 
 
2.1.1. Monopoly power enjoyed by investment bankers 
Investment bankers may have monopoly power that they can use to earn profits by underpricing 
new issues while general commercial banks are barred from entering into equity underwriting. 
Thus, the rule allows investment bankers to deliberately underprice the new issue. Investment 
bankers would prefer exercising this right to make investors fit it and make them improved. For 
the sake of encouraging more investors to participate in financial activities, underwriters usually 




However, investment bankers might use this advantage to increase both the spread between the 
offer price and bid price (OP-BP) as well as the degree to which the offer price is set below the 
markets’ true valuation (P-OP). By underpricing issues a monopolist investment banker can 
increase the probability of being able to sell the whole issues to outside investors. Therefore, 
investment bankers have the incentive to underprice the new issues and earn high revenues. 
Ritter (1998) noted that those underwriters who own better acknowledge about market are using 
underpricing of IPOs to attract buyers to involve in financial trading. 
 
2.1.2. Winners curse phenomenon 
This hypothesis assumes that IPO market consists of two groups of investors: informed investors 
and uninformed investors. As a matter of fact, Initial public offerings (IPOs) represent a group of 
shares about which relatively much is unknown when they appear on the market (Anderson et al. 
1995). Underpricing can be considered as a mildly good solution in IPO markets in which some 
investors are viewed as informed while a larger group is viewed as uninformed. 
 
Informed investors, defined as those who expend resources collecting information of IPOs, will 
bid only for those issues that are superior (underpriced). However, uninformed investors will bid 
randomly across all issues (superior and inferior) on account for they will not involve in costly 
search (Rock 1986). Thus, for good issues, uninformed investors get only a small fraction of 
allotment and informed investors can get a large fraction of allotment in account of informed 
investors’ demand rising. However, the bidders for bad issues will be uninformed investors and 
they achieve a large fraction of allotment for bad issues and a small fraction of allotment for 




Akerlof (1970) argued that information asymmetry about firm value would lead to the classic 
‘lemon’ or ‘adverse selection’ problem (A situation where sellers have information that buyers 
do not about some aspect of product quality or vice versa). In other words, uninformed investors 
might bid underpriced or overpriced offers due to asymmetry of information, which cause unfair 
among investors and market inefficiency in the long term.  
 
And underpricing by issuers has been considered as a costly and difficult to imitate signal to 
convey firm quality to potential investors, who cannot easily tell the difference between good 
and bad IPOs (Allan and Faulhaber, 1989).  
 
In order to keep large group (uninformed investors) in financial market, underwriters have to 
underprice new issue and eliminate potential unfairness in future. Rock (1986) said underpricing 
is necessary to compensate uniformed investors for this winner’s curse adverse selection bias and 
to make them to participate actively in the IPO market. 
 
2.1.3. Legal issues related to the shares 
Due diligence is required to exercise by underwriters and firms in order to make sure all 
information contained in prospectus is justified. Lisa (2007) argued that those investors who hold 
heavily overpriced issues may have an incentive to sue the underwriters because of misleading 
and incomplete information. For this reason, underwriter would like to lower the offer price in 




When a company is going to public it needs to show potential buyers a detailed independent 
report attesting to its financial position. An effective due diligence would become a good tool to 
show management of companies and quality of shares. Financial due-diligence happens when it 
is necessary to check whether firms meet the conditions of IPOs (Charles, 2007).  
 
Due diligence investigation is necessary to reveal financial risk and crisis. To move a forward 
single step, investors can realize and predict the future of companies via reports from 
underwriters, and their abilities to earn profits. And due diligence investigation is consistent with 
real conditions of operation and management, on which investing and trading are based.   
 
To avoid these negative effect and damage to their reputation, risk-reverse underwriters may try 
to keep investors satisfied underpricing IPOs. In other words, when offer price is relatively low 
underwriter do not take risk of being sued by investors who are not satisfied by information the 
underwriters have (Thomas, 2013). High returns could bring high risk and underwriter tries to 
reduce the risk they may have and have to lower the offer price. Hence, legal problems about due 
diligence failure contribute underwriters to make IPOs underpricing. 
 
2.1.4. Dynamic Strategy 
A majority group of firms may try to issue a small portion of shares as IPOs and agree to 
underprice the new issues. In such manner, firms could monitor the performance of their stocks 
and the true price. If these shares perform well, later a large portion of shares will come into the 
secondary market, referred to as second offering. Next, firms with more underpriced IPOs are 
likely to issue secondary offerings because they have more space to grow in the future.  
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Welch (1989) noted that approximately one-third of issuers of IPOs from 1977 to 1982 had 
reissued the equity by 1986, with the typical amount being at least three times the initial offering. 
However, losses from the primary market are more than compensation by gains from secondary 
market. To summarize, promoters could use IPOs underpricing to indicate that they have better 
quality issues than others and, subsequently, raise large amounts of funds from large groups of 
investors.  
 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) argued that underpricing is a signal that this company is good and it 
is worth investing. A partial offering of stock is issued and sold, then information about the firm 
is uncovered, subsequently more stock is reissued and sold with a certain extent initial return.  
 
Underwriters would use this kind of dynamic strategy to public new issues so that firms can earn 
more profits and get more intrinsic value. Ritter (1991) and Loughran (1995) documented that 
larger and more established IPOs have given returns to their investors over the long run 
compared to their smaller and younger counterparts. 
 
2.2 Other Empirical evidence from South Korea and China 
A majority of research is based on developed countries and regions, such as the United States, 
Hong Kong, Japan. In recent years studies about emerging markets went along well in local 
regions, such as South Korea and China. It is very reasonable to choose these two countries to do 




As a matter of fact, scholars could combine superior western thoughts with their own national 
conditions and furthermore they could get more realistic results, which would offer too much 
assistance for government or monitoring department to make a strategic decision. 
 
In the period of 1995 to 2003, the underpricing of 908 IPOs is up to 129% in A shares’ market in 
China when the number is less than 10% in Canada and France (Yihui Liu, 2005). And there are 
two explanations of Chinese underpricing of IPOs about its national system, which are associated 
with Chinese special social formation (socialism).  
 
First, there are two kinds of stocks in A shares’ market, circulation stock and non-circulation 
stock. Circulation stock is possible to trade publicly on the stock exchange while non-circulation 
stock is exclusively belong to government or specific people, and the latter is not good for 
development of market in account of preventing perfect competition of IPOs market. Shortage of 
circulation stock causes a phenomenon, called positive cascade, like getting a bonus when 
investors get offer shares. 
 
Second, strict pricing mechanism and market entries are both closely monitored by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is led by Chinese government. From 2001 
until now, “book building” as a method of pricing IPOs has become popular. Issuers and 
underwriters discuss the price of shares going public, and then predict the potential demand from 
outside investors.  
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In South Korea, a new mechanism named as book building was recognized as a method of 
pricing. As a matter of fact, book building mechanism of IPOs could reduce the effect of 
underpricing in South Korea. 
  
These two different pricing methods have different effects on finance market, which are 
associated with a serious underpricing in South Korea. Thus, high underpricing tendency in the 
IPO market discourages IPOs issued by those companies which cannot afford or do not want 
underpricing and it makes arbitrage activities in the secondary market and in the grey market. 
Thus, the underpricing of IPOs hampers the growth opportunities and makes instability in the 















Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
3.1 Source of data 
In this paper data from two countries is collect from Bloomberg and I select 164 IPOs samples to 
perform the test of significance of factors. These data is from technology companies and in the 
trading process and have gone to public during 2009 to 2014. Global 2008 financial crisis has 
impact on every countries and data that started from 2009 is more objective. 
 
The degree of underpricing (DUP) is measured by initial return (IR), it is defined as: 
DUP = (Pt-P0)/P0, 
 
Where Pt  is the closing price at the end of the first trading day and P0 is the offer price. IR means 
the initial rate of return of IPO. As I mentioned it above, higher initial return makes higher the 
degree of underpricing. 
If DUP > 0, then the stock is underpriced. 
If DUP = 0, then the stock is overpriced. 
If DUP < 0, then the stock is correctly priced. 
 
I choose Korean and Chinese IPOs market and use Bloomberg program to search and collect 
information and data for the pretax income per share, D/E ratio, announcement date, listing date, 
offer price, offer size and closing price, ticker and company’s name.  
 
And the numbers of IPOs sample are both over 100. However, Information of some variables is 
uncompleted and some companies’ historical lines of stock price are delisted during 2009 to 
12 
 
2014. Then 95 IPOs samples of technology companies in Chinese IPOs market and 69 IPOs 
samples of technology companies in South Korean are chosen to engage in this research. Thus, I 
choose five variables to complete the model, including offer price, offer timing, and offer size, 
pretax income per share and D/E ratio. 
 
Offer price from Bloomberg is lightly different from offer price (adjusted). And by searching 
closing price at the end of first day, I found offer price (adjusted) is more real and reasonable 
when the initial return is calculated. Thus I choose offer price (adjusted) as the first variable to 
run the regression. 
 
Offer timing is the difference value between listing date and announcement date. When a 
company decides to go to public, it would announce the news to the public and get more time to 
prepare.  
 
Offer size is a factor that is used by previous researches and when the news come out public 
would choose to judge its uncertainty.  Thus, a reasonable offer size would lower risk that 
outside investors take. 
 
Pretax income per share is a good element to estimate this model. Its function in a model is like a 
P/E ratio whereas different tax policies in different countries may have different impact on 




D/E ratio in this paper is total debt divided by total equity. Leverage could influence outside 
investors’ decisions. And D/E ratio could reflect companies’ financial conditions. 
 
A complete regression process consists of two steps. The first step is to get the mean and 
standard deviation of samples by Excel program. The second step is to run the regression model 
by Stata program. Thereafter, I would analyze the results by comparing the difference between 
two countries. 
3.2 Methodology 
 Least square regression model is used to evaluate the degree of underpricing which is the 
dependent variable and independent variables have been mentioned above. 
 
The regression model is expressed as following equation: 








+ β4X4 + β5X5 + ε 
Where 
X1= Offer Price (adjusted)  
X2 =Log of Offer Timing 
X3 = Log of Offer Size 
X4 = Pretax Income per Share of Issuing Firm 
X5 = D/E Ratio of Issuing Firm 
 
In the equation above, X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5 are independent variables. DUP is the dependent 
variable, α0
 
is a constant term, β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5
 
are unknown parameters to be estimated and 






1. X1 = Offer Price 
Offer price is the price at a broker is willing to sell a certain security. When underwriters set a 
lower price to go to public, the degree of underpricing might be high along with real price 
showing. It is fundamental and basic element to complete this research. 
Hypothesis 1: A negative correlation between offer price and degree of underpricing. 
 
2. X2 =Log of Offer Timing 
The second is offer timing. In this paper offer timing is defined as the number of days between 
announcement date and listing date. Longer time for preparation for going public makes 
information provided by underwriters more specific and closes to real price. Outsider investors 
tend to rely on information provided by underwriters.  
Hypothesis 2: A positive correlation between log of offer timing and degree of underpricing. 
 
3. X3 = Log of Offer Size 
The third is offer size. Offer size is an important factor when scholars write this kind of paper. 
And higher log of offer size contributes lower uncertainty of company. Thus, there is no need for 
underwriter to set a lower price when they face less risk. And issuers would like to sell prices at 
higher prices because such value of firm could improve. 
Hypothesis 3: A negative correlation between log of offer size and degree of underpricing. 
     
4. X4 = Pretax Income per Share of Issuing Firm 
The forth is pretax income per share. The different tax policies in different countries may have 
different impact on earnings per share, that is, pretax income per share is a good element to 
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estimate this model. Higher pretax income per share makes lower degree of underpricing. Higher 
pretax income makes investors more confidence about stocks’ future.  
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative correlation between pre-tax income per share of issuing firm. 
 
5. X5 = D/E Ratio of Issuing Firm 
The fifth is D/E ratio. When a company has a lot debt burden outside investors would not choose 
the company’s shares. However, investors are worried about their future and ability to repay. The 
second hypothesis is higher D/E ratio makes higher degree of underpricing. When the stock’s 
rating makes investors hold no hope of its rising, it is impossible for them to buy the stock at 
high price, which makes underwriter has to lower the initial offer price.  















Chapter 4: Analysis and Comparison of Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
We begin our analysis with descriptive analysis of variables in our model. Table 4.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of dependent for China. Table 4.2 also indicates the descriptive statistics of 
variables for South Korea. Both reveal the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum and 
median of independent variables. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables in China 
Variable Sample Size    Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Max Min Median 
Offer Price 95 19.35 14.71 66 0.355 19.4 
Log of offer 
size 
95 6.34 0.99 10.73 3.83 6.26 
Log of offer 
timing 
95 2.66 2.04 6.53 0 3.0 




95 0.304 0.403 1.13 -1.18 0.31 
 
 
The size of samples is 95. From 2010 to 2014 there are over 100 IPOs happened in China. 
Whereas not every company’s historical line is listed. Thus 95 samples of IPOs are selected.  
 
The mean of offer price of China is 19.35CNY, about 3.15USD, which is extremely low. And 
maximum offer price is 66RMB, about 10.75USD. The mean of log of offer size is 6.34. 
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Minimum of log of offer timing is 0, which means offer timing equals 1. When companies 
announce their planning of going to public in the market investors could bid shares of these 
companies in the same day. The mean of D/E ratio is 39.144 and pretax income per share is only 
0.304CNY, about 0.05USD. 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables in South Korea 
Variable Sample Size Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Max Min Median 
Offer Price 69 25629 151170 1260000 208 3900 
Log of 
Offer Size 




69 3.09 1.11 4.30 0 3.53 




69 2956.64 22287.98 185034 -3200.12 -12.51 
 
 
The mean of offer price of South Korea is 25629KRW, about 25.12USD. And maximum of log 
of offer size is 8.85. It is noticeable for researchers to consider that D/E ratio is 175.30, which is 
fully high. The mean of pretax income per share is 2956.64KRW, about 2.8USD. 
 
And the initial returns are respectively 12.06% in China and 40% in South Korea. The degree of 




4.2 Comparison of different independent variables  
 The mean of offer price is relatively high in South Korea and low in China. This phenomenon is 
reasonable because South Korea’s GDP per capita is much higher than China’s, which 
contributes to lower income per capita in China. Thus, a lower offer price could attract more 
investment from small investors. Technology industry is more developed and it is a dominant 
industry in South Korea. There are amounts of high-technology companies, such as Samsung, its 
products spreads all over the world. Due to intense competition companies tend to choose 
underprice of IPOs to attract investors to buy their stocks. 
 
Offer size is larger in South Korea, and it result from its economic characteristic. In South Korea 
large enterprises support the whole national economy and they are called “Chaebol”. They can 
get more financial aids than small business and government would encourage them to go to 
public to raise fund they need. In the other hand, Chinese government would like to support 
small-size and medium-size business when they are closely related to the people’s livelihood.  
 
Offer timing is longer in South Korea than China. We may suggest that China has less time to 
prepare for initial public offering after they announce their plans whereas their difference is tiny. 
 
D/E ratio is almost four times in South Korea than China. When a company has a heavy financial 
burden, it would has an bad impact on the quality and rating of stock and in further step would 
influence the degree of underprice of IPOs that would be stated in later section. 
 
Pretax income per share is lower in China than in Korea. 
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4.3  The Results of Regression Model 
Table 4.3 shows the result of regression model about China’s initial return for technology sector. 
There are six independent variables in the regression model for China including constant term. 
Offer size, log of offer timing, log of issuing size, D/E ratio and pretax income are mainly 
consistent with my expectation.  
 
From the Table 4.3 we could get that the coefficient of constant term is 0.129 (positive) and it 
means that the initial return is positive when other independent variables are zero. 
 
Table 4.3: the regression result of model in China 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the result of regression model about South Korea’s initial return for technology 
sector. There are six independent variables in the regression model for South Korea including the 
constant term. From the Table 4.4 we suggest that the coefficient of constant term is -0.0132 




Table 4.4: the regression result of model in South Korea 
 
4.3.1 Offer Price 
Parameter of offer price is β1 and from this model the slop coefficient for offer price of IPO are 
respectively -0.018 for China and 0.0000451 for South Korea, which means the offer price of 
IPO increase by 1 dollar, the initial return decrease by 0.018 in China and increase by 0.000451. 
Offer price could indicate the quality of stock and would give investors and underwriter useful 
financial information.   
 
The t ratios for offer price in the regression model are respectively -6.40 and 1.78, and the value 
of Prob. (t) for China is 0.000, which is less than 0.05. And the value of Prob. (t) for South Korea 
is 0.079, greater than 0.05 but still less than 0.1. Thus, the offer price has a significant effect on 
initial return and this result is consistent with previous research. 
 
4.3.2 Log of offer size 
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Generally speaking, log of offer size has a negative relationship with initial return because β2, the 
coefficients of log of offer size are both negative. Offer size could show the level of uncertainty. 
Larger offer size can makes lower uncertainty of firm, which contributes to lower degree of 
underpricing. Traditionally, this theory could go its way in explaining IPO underpricing 
phenomenon. 
 
Meantime the t ratios are -0.70 and -0.35. Prob. (t) are 0.483 and 0.728, both greater than 0.1, 
which indicates that log of offer size is an insignificant factor to degree of underpricing of IPOs. 
This may be attributed to the support for small and medium-size firms from government and 
public.  
 
4.3.3 Log of offer timing 
0.02 and 0.22 are β3 the coefficients of log of offer timing, which are obviously positive. Log of 
offer timing has a positive relationship with initial return. Longer offer timing makes higher 
uncertainty.  
 
There is a big difference between offer timing and age of firm before going to public. Offer 
timing is the number of days between announcement date and listing date. When a company 
decides to go to public and prepare well, the management announce this news to outsiders.  
 
It would take a while to go to public and investors could buy stocks of this company. If offer 
timing is very long, some situation changes, which means that more uncertainty happens. 
22 
 
Moreover, the t ratios are 1.00 and 1.11 when Prob. (t) is 0.271 and 0.323, both more than 0.05. 
Thus, log of offer timing has an insignificant effect on initial return. 
 
4.3.4 D/E ratio 
β4, the coefficients of D/E ratio are 0.0011 and 0.0012, both positive, which means it has a 
positive relationship with initial return.  
 
When a firm has a heavy financial burden and borrow more money from banks than 
shareholders, underwriter would lower the price at which shares are sold in the first time because 
high D/E ratios are exposed to bad quality.  
 
The t ratios are 1.82 and 2.4. The Prob.(t) are respectively 0.073 in China and 0.019 in South 
Korea, both less 0.1 and 0.019 less than 0.05. Thus, D/E ratio has a significant effect on initial 
return. 
 
4.3.5 Pretax income per share 
β5  are 0.27 and -0.0003, which means pretax income per share has a positive relationship with 
initial return and has a negative relationship with initial return.  
 
Pretax income per share is different from earnings per share, just considering the different tax 
policies would have an effect on initial return. And the t ratios are 2.34 and -1.78. Prob. (t) is 




This factor has a significant effect on initial return for China and has a mildly insignificant effect 
on initial return for South Korea. Different pretax income per share would influence the offer 





















Chapter 5: Conclusion, Limitation and Recommendation 
 
5.1 Conclusion of the Study 
IPO underpricing is a common phenomenon in the world’s stock market. Compared to well-
developed countries, emerging countries have a higher level of underpricing of      
IPO, especially for high-technology industries. And research has found that any single factors 
could not well explain the degree of underpricing of IPOs.  
 
This research tested the initial return underpricing level for a sample of total 164 IPOs for 
technology sector in China and South Korea from 2010 to 2014. Results have shown that offer 
price, D/E ratio and pretax income per share affect the degree of underpricing of IPOs. On the 
other hand, there are two independent variables which are not statistically significant in the 
model, which are offer size and offer timing. 
 
The results of this regression model show that the R square is 0.38 for China and 0.15 for South 
Korea. R square values ranges from 0 to 100. An R square of 100 means that initial return is 
completely explained by independent variables selected. And a lower R square means that we 
should ignore the coefficient of independent variables.  
 
R square is a proper statistic to examine that whether the independent variables fit with the initial 
return. The results indicate that this model should be improved because of lower R square 
especially for South Korea.  
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The selected independent variables could not sufficiently explain the degree of underpricing of 
IPOs. There is 38% of the variation in dependent variable which could explained by independent 
variables. And there is only 15% of the variation in dependent variable which could explained by 
independent variables. 
 
5.2 Limitation of this research 
Previous research usually examined that log of issuing size is an important factor on IPO 
underpricing in stock market. However, it is an insignificant factor in this regression model. 
 
Due to traits of high technology firms issuing size might not have a big impact on degree of 
underpricing of IPOs. High technology is making an advance all the time and advanced 
technology could make a small firm get a good quality and future to outside investors, which 
could contribute to a lower underpricing of IPOs. 
 
And those samples are from Bloomberg Program and historical lines of stock price of a few 
firms are delisted, which would have a small impact on the initial return between 2010 and 2014. 
When selecting samples, I tend to avoid the 2009 global financial crisis so IPOs samples starts 
from 2010. That causes not enough samples for this research especially when I only choose high 
technology sector. 
 
South Korea has different economic, political conditions with China. When comparing those two 





Firstly, R square is relatively low in this model, which indicates further researchers should select 
more variables to examine the initial return, such as age of issuing firm before going to public, 
reputation of issuing firm. 
 
Second, large amounts of samples would make results more specific than small amounts of 
samples. Further researchers could get samples from 1990s’, and exclude the samples that 
happened in financial crisis. 
 
Third, China has a short history of financial market. Its stock market and price of IPOs is closely 
monitored by government and controlled by leaders of market. Thus, political elements should 
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CH 45713 87.97 0.22 2.1 2.1 
000725 
CH 9044.7 87.97 0.22 2.525 3.03 
600403 
CH 7539 13.86 0.7 10.42 20.84 
600703 
CH 3299.99 60.92 0.58 14.5333 21.8 
600703 




-1.78 11.25 36 
002414 
CH 1950 10.51 0.1 13 26 
002230 
CH 1753.31 2.93 0.43 11.4118 19.4 
992 HK 1728.33 35.99 0.6 4.7 4.7 
601012 
CH 1575 38.41 0.17 11.6667 21 
1980 HK 1485.85 
 
-0.88 5.28 5.28 
992 HK 1461.13 35.99 0.6 6.35 6.35 
300080 




0.71 7.86849 58 
002405 
CH 1433.6 2.08 0.18 14.8148 25.6 
981 HK 1253.12 45.2 0.03 0.6 0.6 
992 HK 1317.3 35.99 0.6 5.451 5.451 
300102 
CH 1327.5 2.69 0.42 18 45 
002577 
CH 1216 1.07 0.14 17.1946 38 
300316 
CH 1100.55 0.65 0.13 11 33 
300150 
CH 1154.65 7.81 0.29 16.495 32.99 
002236 
CH 1004.19 5.48 0.99 33.6 33.6 
000977 
CH 1000 173.54 0.37 20.055 40.11 
300323 
CH 1000 39.73 0.02 8.88889 20 
000066 
CH 1000 62.3 -0.33 4.48 4.48 
434 HK 891.111 
 
0.53 5.35 5.35 
1165 HK 884.003 223.13 -1.1 2.8 2.8 
002288 




CH 962 1.33 0.11 6.16667 37 
300369 
CH 867.15 4.44 0.99 25.625 41 
002156 




0.27 33.6923 43.8 
300346 
CH 829.62 0.61 0.71 33 66 
601231 
CH 811.68 32.81 0.62 7.6 7.6 
300168 
CH 840 27.06 0.3 7 28 
002218 
CH 808.5 32.15 0.03 14 21 
300205 
CH 796.4 23.31 0.23 7.40741 40 
002296 
CH 713.513 0.51 0.43 16.28 16.28 




0.29 6.07383 25.32 
300075 
CH 756 8.09 0.5 16 54 
002161 
CH 694.105 3.59 0.07 9.63 19.26 
300104 
CH 730 82.22 0.31 3.67666 29.2 
600845 
CH 650 31.46 0.97 28 28 
300130 
CH 693.28 4.75 0.5 24.0722 43.33 
981 HK 678.727 45.2 0.03 0.52 0.52 
002642 
CH 625 13.94 0.48 8.33333 25 
300378 




0.32 6.25 25 
600460 
CH 600 52.7 0.11 7.69231 20 
300177 
CH 585 2.62 0.31 5.85 46.8 
300271 
CH 569.8 0.48 0.78 15.4 30.8 
002649 
CH 550 9.63 0.84 14.6667 22 
300166 
CH 563.343 4.92 0.41 9.64198 55.36 
300365 
CH 521.977 12.68 0.87 24.0056 43.21 
002079 
CH 517.968 3.19 0.05 7.26667 13.08 
600410 




CH 517.82 67.83 0.34 6.34583 30.46 
300349 
CH 465 7.02 0.77 10.3333 31 
300202 
CH 474.456 5.11 0.55 3.4537 22.38 
600460 




2.55 34 34 
992 HK 474.257 35.99 0.6 5.35 5.35 
002230 




0.35 8.82353 15 
002649 
CH 400.4 9.63 0.84 26 26 
1900 HK 434.615 35.15 0.12 4.8 4.8 
002504 
CH 432 23.66 -0.12 12.3077 16 
000997 
CH 434 26.93 0.57 7.5 7.5 
300096 
CH 435.6 1.01 0.27 9.9 19.8 
300300 
CH 396 8.1 0.33 8.18182 18 
300297 
CH 392 36.02 0.18 8 16 
300277 
CH 391 17.36 0.04 11.5 23 
002657 
CH 383.9 38.97 0.61 14.6667 22 
600728 
CH 358.563 42.05 0.2 10.51 10.51 
002185 
CH 365.848 46.3 0.35 6.95 11.12 
300253 
CH 371.25 0.51 0.39 6.87659 27.5 
1165 HK 359.93 223.13 -1.1 1.11 1.11 
002178 
CH 340 28 0.16 4.28571 9 
300287 
CH 315 29.18 0.31 5 15 
300104 
CH 300.001 82.22 0.31 41.1 41.1 
300377 
CH 298.883 7.06 0.98 21.58 21.58 
300241 
CH 291.6 19.11 0.3 5.4 10.8 
600203 
CH 278 96.51 0.33 6.43 6.43 
300379 
CH 282.883 37.47 1.08 22 22 
002253 




CH 260 0.31 0.45 20 20 
981 HK 235.763 45.2 0.03 0.53 0.53 
300236 
CH 238.005 8.52 0.55 11.07 11.07 




CH 210.936 47.59 -0.34 8.61667 15.51 
300350 
CH 205.865 45.69 0.43 9.5 9.5 
300231 
CH 196.2 8.89 0.26 3.63333 19.62 
300290 
CH 188.87 20.54 0.45 5.555 11.11 
712 HK 200.778 29.12 -0.1 2.3 2.3 
002169 
CH 189.7 76.23 0.12 10.6667 16 
712 HK 167.621 29.12 -0.1 1.74 1.74 
981 HK 161.586 45.2 0.03 0.475 0.475 
992 HK 177.458 35.99 0.6 5.03 5.03 
300390 
CH 165.165 17.81 0.72 8.47 8.47 
1522 HK 162.236 2.88 0.07 1 1 
686 HK 153.761 516.73 -1.18 1.45 1.45 
000948 
CH 122.7 40.55 0.06 8.18 8.18 
8045 HK 52.6401 56.19 0.02 0.355 0.355 
























log of issuing 
size log of offer timing initial return 
000725 
CH 2.31 10.730138 2.079441542 0.1 
000725 
CH 2.6 9.10993423 0 0.024752475 
600403 








CH 13.494 8.016317899 0 0.146769667 
002506 
CH 14.887 7.77317368 4.094344562 0.101027778 
002414 




CH 22.941 7.469260709 0.693147181 0.59428866 
992 HK 4.92 7.454910903 1.098612289 0.046808511 
601012 
CH 10.972 7.362010551 4.644390899 
-
0.033080952 
1980 HK 5.72 7.303742278 2.63905733 0.083333333 












CH 16.649 7.267944042 4.753590191 0.071648438 
981 HK 0.64 7.13339172 0.693147181 0.066666667 




CH 31.872 7.191052753 4.317488114 0.308266667 
002577 




CH 11.627 7.003565334 4.49980967 0.019 
300150 
CH 29.7 7.051552547 3.784189634 0.40027281 
002236 




CH 25.655 6.907755279 1.098612289 0.139616056 
300323 
CH 8.853 6.907755279 4.418840608 -0.0017945 
000066 
CH 9.6 6.907755279 0.693147181 1.142857143 
434 HK 6.09 6.792468999 2.564949357 0.138317757 
1165 HK 4.69 6.784460456 3.583518938 0.675 
002288 
CH 9.983 6.813443501 1.098612289 0.24474406 
002474 






CH 36.9 6.765211972 6.533788838 0.275 
002156 








CH 40.91 6.720967765 4.96284463 0.119848485 
601231 
CH 12.58 6.699106174 6.445719819 0.655263158 
300168 




CH 19.007 6.695180679 0.693147181 0.238428571 
300205 
CH 6.672 6.680101572 3.044522438 -0.01838525 
002296 
CH 20.85 6.570200657 1.098612289 0.280712531 
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300170 
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300104 
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002642 
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300378 
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1900 HK 4.95 6.074460582 0 0.03125 
002504 
CH 22.492 6.068425588 3.912023005 0.63651875 
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CH 10.93 6.073044534 0.693147181 0.457333333 
300096 
CH 14.615 6.076724391 4.624972813 0.238131313 
300300 
CH 10.159 5.981414211 4.465908119 0.109843333 
300297 
CH 9.055 5.97126184 4.700480366 0.0659375 
300277 
CH 15.6 5.96870756 5.010635294 0.17826087 
002657 
CH 26.707 5.950382102 4.248495242 0.547286364 
600728 
CH 14.19 5.882104377 0 0.350142721 
002185 




CH 10.745 5.91687569 3.761200116 0.140669455 




CH 5.995 5.828945618 0.693147181 0.189921111 
300287 
CH 5.217 5.752572639 4.465908119 0.014466667 
300104 
CH 36.89 5.703785808 1.609437912 -0.10243309 
300377 
CH 31.08 5.700052192 6.405228458 0.440222428 
300241 
CH 9.425 5.675383 3.871201011 0.372685185 
600203 
CH 8.34 5.627621114 0.693147181 0.297045101 
300379 
CH 31.68 5.645033385 6.345636361 0.44 
002253 
CH 18.119 5.572412554 2.995732274 0.003915307 




981 HK 0.55 5.462827063 0 0.037735849 
300236 
CH 15.8 5.472291682 4.248495242 0.427280939 








CH 14.63 5.327220614 5.564520407 0.54 
300231 
CH 4.661 5.279134547 4.158883083 0.052378695 
300290 
CH 8.76 5.241058948 4.624972813 0.288478848 
712 HK 2.39 5.30219982 1.386294361 0.039130435 
002169 
CH 13.8 5.245443877 0.693147181 0.19583125 
712 HK 1.83 5.121705479 0.693147181 0.051724138 
981 HK 0.48 5.085037509 0 0.010526316 
992 HK 5.08 5.178733961 0.693147181 0.009940358 
300390 
CH 8.47 5.106944974 2.995732274 0 
1522 HK 0.73 5.089052065 2.564949357 -0.27 
686 HK 1.54 5.035399449 2.397895273 0.062068966 
000948 
CH 8.09 4.809742352 0.693147181 
-
0.011002445 
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Pre-tax Income per 
Share 
000660 
KS 923150 23500 23500 4217.03 
005930 
KS 340074 1260000 1260000 185034 
000660 
KS 229761 23300 23300 4217.03 
046890 
KS 186960 45600 45600 1356.08 
121440 
KS 170000 85000 28333.3 1638.25 
000660 
KS 124416 28200 28200 4217.03 
110570 
KS 85490 4000 3594.56 -539.7 
063080 
KS 62169.6 64000 64000 2140.82 
153490 
KS 44100 4900 4900 -213.08 
042700 
KS 38195.2 15200 15200 590.52 
061970 
KS 37600 4700 4700 -12.51 
154040 
KS 24000 24000 24000 6910.54 
114120 
KS 28326.6 23500 9400 -1155 
123860 
KS 24440 52000 17343 483.83 
092220 
KS 20000 500 3069.45 -691.79 
141000 
KS 18285 15900 15900 395.72 
085810 
KS 17000 8500 8500 983.19 
123100 
KS 16200 13500 13500 18.01 
088390 
KS 15750 11250 9161.53 3182.46 
089030 
KS 14950 23000 7666.67 597.83 
155650 
KS 11677.9 6000 6000 603.04 
115450 
KS 11510.9 11000 11000 -518.76 
097800 
KS 10109.6 4000 4000 -689.3 
131400 
KS 10800 2700 2700 148.01 
089850 
KS 11000 11000 11000 -241.95 





KS 9884.25 4500 4500 897.92 
073570 
KS 10140 3380 3380 -929.52 
150900 
KS 9280 5800 5800 226.94 
074000 
KS 8691.93 1185 5925 -477.97 
121850 
KS 8850 7500 7500 -69.23 
064520 
KS 8338.5 1635 1374.73 77.23 
096690 
KS 8250 5500 2750 368.48 
119830 
KS 8190 9100 9100 55.31 
059120 
KS 7000 7000 7000 724.93 
099830 
KS 7582 8500 1668.9 -151.18 
064290 
KS 7000 7000 7000 -719.78 
066700 
KS 4873.42 8330 8330 45.19 
171010 
KS 4875 3900 3900 558.51 
090850 
KS 4400 4400 4400 522.71 
131090 
KS 4458.23 4900 4900 263 
070300 
KS 4375 5000 5000 375.99 
068940 
KS 4200 2800 2800 44.84 
072950 
KS 3432 4400 4400 363.08 
079970 
KS 3160 8000 4000 407.58 
041460 
KS 2240 1600 1600 293.27 
025560 
KS 2084.99 208 208 -27.81 
053810 
KS 999.474 742 742 -1033.83 
078860 
KS 999.998 2610 2610 -187.5 
040350 
KS 998.8 1135 1135 17.74 
096040 
KS 999.975 1005 743.425 -58.73 
058370 
KS 1000 728 728 -233.2 
052020 
KS 1000.18 3770 3770 -1201.28 





KS 999.012 245 245 -27.81 
078860 
KS 999.999 700 700 -187.5 
065560 
KS 998.64 1520 1520 -344.24 
033430 
KS 999.972 564 564 -106.02 
051780 
KS 999.75 1550 1550 -63.17 
023770 
KS 999.99 615 3075 -3200.12 
049470 
KS 1000 1495 1312.28 5.61 
078860 
KS 1000.18 4665 4665 -187.5 
096630 
KS 993.127 1445 1011.5 146.34 
033430 
KS 990 500 500 -106.02 
039850 
KS 999.18 1260 2520 -633.31 
074000 
KS 999.822 1065 5325 -477.97 
028040 
KS 1000.09 2565 2565 -621.14 
043580 
KS 999.1 1030 1030 41.49 
071930 
KS 990 500 500 -203.08 
064520 
KS 999.999 693 693 77.23 
053810 
KS 942.56 548 548 -1033.83 
054180 
KS 997.05 3450 3450 270.05 
058370 
KS 298.697 601 601 -233.2 
058370 
KS 260.49 570 570 -233.2 
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